Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context
Preprint
- 1 January 1997
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We use a rational expectations model to examine how public disclosure requirements affect listing decisions by rent-seeking corporate insiders, and allocation decisions by liquidity traders seeking to minimize trading costs. We find that exchanges competing for trading volume engage in a "race for the top" where under disclosure requirements increase and trading costs fall. This result is robust to diversification incentives of risk-averse liquidity traders, institutional impediments that restrict the flow of liquidity, and listing costs. Under certain conditions, unrestricted liquidity flows to low disclosure exchanges. The consequences of cross-listing also are modeled.Keywords
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