A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 48 (1) , 18-46
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90118-x
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods MonopolyEconometrica, 1989
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjectureJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1984
- Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete InformationEconometrica, 1984
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral tradingJournal of Economic Theory, 1983
- Durable-Goods MonopolistsJournal of Political Economy, 1982
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1982
- Rational Expectations and Durable Goods PricingThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1981
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1979