Tax Structure and Public Spending ‐ Or How the Electorate Is Deceived into Paying for Bigger Public Spending than It Really Wants
- 1 December 1986
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 9 (4) , 317-336
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00353.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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