Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 713-751
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.08.014
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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