Certifying software for high-assurance environments
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 16 (4) , 48-54
- https://doi.org/10.1109/52.776948
Abstract
It does not make sense to grant carte blanche high-assurance certificates to product that may be used across multiple platforms and in multiple environments. We should bind software certification to a product's known environment and operational profile. The author proposes three techniques for verifying high assurance: desirable-behavior testing, abnormal testing, and fault injection. Each uses the product's operational profile to detect software-related anomalies that might allow a catastrophic eventKeywords
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