Partisan Advantage and Constitutional Change: The Case of the Seventeenth Amendment
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Studies in American Political Development
- Vol. 10 (1) , 69-102
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x00001425
Abstract
A constitution is a set of rules written by current political actors designed to bind future political actors. As fundamental law, it stipulates basic rights and duties, defines collective goals, establishes institutions and procedures, and makes claims regarding both identity and allegiance. In their effort to control the future, constitutional founders usually include special provisions regarding change. Alterations to the fundamental law are more difficult to accomplish than alterations to more ordinary laws. Founders often require super-majorities, even special, repetitive, or con-current super-majorities, as a condition for amendment. In this sense, even democratic constitutions impose conscious constraints on the exercise of democratic will. The intention is to limit the pace of adaptation and also to bias the pattern of outcomes.Keywords
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