Abstract
This article examines several bilateral and multilateral programmes that were designed to forward El Salvador's transition from a war‐torn society to a democratic polity. Both procedural and substantive democratic strengthening measures were pursued by external donors within the national framework for reconstruction, and independently through larger Central American initiatives. Because links between development and democracy are not clearly understood this article questions the implicit assumption accepted by foreign donors that democracy will be a by‐product of development assistance. To illustrate this point, state‐level procedural reforms and local level reconstruction and reconciliation interventions are assessed. Particular attention is paid to the Development Programme for Refugees, Displaced and Repatriated in Central America (PRODERE) which is compared with two other local level interventions. In a comparative setting, PRODERE highlights the potential of development assistance to open a hitherto exclusionary political arena and add substance to procedural democratic reforms. The article concludes that development interventions that fail to simultaneously address the causes as well as consequences of war‐torn societies cannot claim to alter the balance of power. Hence, they cannot be considered as development assistance that is supportive of transition to democracy.

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