Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain
- 1 July 1989
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 41 (4) , 500-535
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2010528
Abstract
This essay addresses the question, “Why do different democracies pursue different public policies?” through an examination of taxation policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain. The essay demonstrates how the different decision-making structures found in these three democracies (characterized as pluralist, corporatist, and party government systems, respectively) bias each polity toward different types of policy outcomes. The key argument is that institutional structures are the context in which political actors must necessarily define their policy preferences and determine their strategic objectives. Institutional structures thus provide a central link between individual choice behavior and macro policy outcomes.Keywords
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