A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs
- 1 April 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 12 (1) , 49-66
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(95)00037-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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