Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect
- 1 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 12 (4) , 300-330
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s1042-9573(03)00046-9
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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