Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework
- 1 July 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 68 (1) , 33-85
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(94)90095-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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