Abstract
In this paper, we examine an argument of Jauch and Piron, which aims to prove the impossibility of hidden variables underlying the quantum theory, on the basis of certain assumptions that are weaker than those used by von Neumann for the same purpose. We show that, while the assumptions of Jauch and Piron are in fact weaker than those of von Neumann, the net result is that they actually prove nothing new at all. The conclusions of Jauch and Piron concerning the nonexistence of hidden variables are indeed seen to follow from a false assumption; i.e., that the impossibility of propositions that describe simultaneously the results of measurements of two noncommuting observables is an "empirical fact." Actually, it is shown that this assumption follows if and only if one first assumes what the authors set out to prove; i.e., that the current linguistic structure of quantum mechanics is the only one that can be used correctly to describe the empirical facts underlying the theory.

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