The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within‐ and Between‐Patent Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceuticals Industry
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 45 (S2) , 643-672
- https://doi.org/10.1086/374703
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