Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
- 1 August 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (3) , 663-691
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555316
Abstract
We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. We analyze how the distribuKeywords
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