Prospects for corporatist decision‐making in the European union: The social policy agreement

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Abstract
Setting out the legal framework for European collective bargaining, the Social Policy Agreement appended to the Maastricht Treaty appears to introduce some corporatist characteristics to the Union policy process. This article explores whether this legal framework really does represent a sufficient basis for introducing a new, corporatist policy formation mode at the European level. The main conclusion is that the existing infrastructure of organized management and labour at the European level, as well as that of the European Union (EU) institutions concerned, does not provide the appropriate institutional set‐up for corporatist policy partnership formalized by the Maastricht Social Annex. Nevertheless, the Agreement is not without utility. If its ‘reflexive potential’ (i.e. its capability to shape European collective bargaining by defining procedural norms and limiting or expanding the competences of the social partners) is taken into account, the Agreement can be regarded as a framework under which the legal premises can be transformed into self‐regulatory procedures for social policy in the Union.