‘Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy’ by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon
- 31 December 1983
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 123-125
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90052-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate ModelJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling governmentJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1980
- Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal PlansJournal of Political Economy, 1977