The Justification of Induction

1 December 1992

journal article
Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science

Vol. 59 (4) , 527-539
https://doi.org/10.1086/289693

Abstract

We show there is only one consistent way to update a probability assignment, that given by Bayes's rule. The price of inconsistent updating is a loss of efficiency. The implications of this for the problem of induction are discussed.

Keywords

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