Can no competition policy be better than some competition policy?
- 31 January 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 19 (1-2) , 55-77
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00048-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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