An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union

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Abstract
The long-range research (Guetzkow and Hollist, 1976) in which this piece is nested aims at bringing together and “adding-up” segments of knowledge regarding international affairs. The goal is to develop a series of increasingly comprehensive theories of international relations in the format of computer simulation. This paper empirically analyzes various hypothesized explanations of competitive arms processes. Richardson-type arms race models and several modifications thereof are empirically tested for the United States and the Soviet Union from 1948–1970. The findings suggest that the process of arms build-ups is not identical for the two countries. Of eight alternative explanations considered, one model more adequately explains increases in U.S. arms, while another model more adequately fits the case of the Soviet Union. These findings provide an empirical basis for a model of arms processes which will be incorporated into a comprehensive computer simulation composed of this and other empirically analyzed modules (theories) of processes ongoing in international affairs.

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