General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models
- 1 March 1993
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 87 (1) , 61-73
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2938956
Abstract
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models - Volume 87 Issue 1 - Paul Huth, Bruce RussettKeywords
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