Autobiographical knowledge and autobiographical memories

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Abstract
The central argument of this chapter is that there are no such things as autobiographical memories at least in the sense of discrete, holistic, units in long-term memory. Rather, autobiographical memories are conceived as temporary mental representations constructed and maintained by a set of central processes such as the central executive of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1980). Although the view that memory is constructive or reconstructive is not new (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1976, 1981; Schank, 1982) there have been relatively few attempts to specify processes involved in memory construction (but see Kolodner, 1983). One aim of the present chapter is to provide at least an outline sketch of the types of knowledge, processes, and constraints mediating the construction of autobiographical memories. In order to achieve this outline sketch, a synthesis of a number of extant theoretical proposals is required, and in the sections that follow I summarize what is known of autobiographical knowledge, how this can be constructed into memories, and how this whole process may become disrupted in neurological disorders of memory. Finally, I briefly consider the encoding of autobiographical memories and the types of recollective experience characteristic of autobiographical remembering. Autobiographical knowledge Conway and Rubin (1993) in their review of the area described at least three types of autobiographical knowledge identified in recent research.

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