Optimal strategies for dynamic games and the incentive to cooperate
- 1 February 1983
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Systems Science
- Vol. 14 (2) , 179-200
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00207728308926450
Abstract
Strategies proposed for non-cooperative dynamic games representing economic competition have been suboptimal and dynamically inconsistent because they ignore the implicit non-causality facing each player. This paper specifies and evaluates the optimal equilibrium strategies for an unrestrictedly competitive game. The results are compared to the dynamic Staekelberg and Cournot strategies. The suboptimality in ignoring non-causality may exceed that in ignoring the game altogether : and it will systematically overstate the gains to possible cooperative decisionsKeywords
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