An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- 1 February 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (1) , 85-114
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555136
Abstract
This paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy-making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who presentKeywords
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