An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- 1 September 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 25 (3) , 355-383
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02425262
Abstract
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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