Knowledge and Lotteries
Top Cited Papers
- 20 November 2003
- book
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
This book is organised around an epistemological puzzle, which consists of a tension between various ordinary claims to know and our apparent incapacity to know whether or not someone will lose a lottery. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things which entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. The author explores various potential solutions to this puzzle, and issues on the nature and importance of knowledge. In the process, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent topics at the foundations of semantics.Keywords
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