Why inferences might be restricted
- 1 January 1993
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Discourse Processes
- Vol. 16 (1-2) , 181-192
- https://doi.org/10.1080/01638539309544836
Abstract
Inferences are both commonplace and elusive in reading. The key question is: What principles separate the commonplace from the elusive? Although those who argue for online goal‐directed inferences may be correct, the evidence in favor of such inferences is yet not substantial and is open to other interpretations. Higher level inferences may be restricted in part because, unlike syntactic processes, they do not operate in response to simple memory symbols, but depend on complex compositional representations that might not always be available.Keywords
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