Values and Decision Making in Educational Administration

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Abstract
The argument for the primacy of subjective values in educational administration is increasingly gaining prominence. Of concern is the argument's central claim that attention to subjective values can overcome the perceived irrelevance of scientific administration and organization theory and help us make better decisions. There are at least two reasons why the "case for values" does not succeed. First, the conception of subjective values presented as a viable alternative is identical with that of positivists such as Weber and Simon. Second, the notion of noncognitive and subjective values itself is incoherent and does not allow for judgment between values. If we are interested in making better decisions, then we are ill-advised to embrace subjective values that are devoid of empirical content, but attend to the positivist assumptions that shore up the distinction between "values "and "science" in educational administration.

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