Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
- 1 November 1992
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 6 (4) , 103-118
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.4.103
Abstract
Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.Keywords
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