Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.

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Abstract
In a social dilemma game, a period of discussion among subjects substantially increases the incidence of cooperative choices. We conducted two experiments in an effort to explain this effect. Experiment 1 tested and rejected the hypothesis that discussion of the dilemma problem promotes generalized norms in favor of cooperation. Content analysis of discussion sessions in Experiment 1 suggested that promises to cooperate are important in an explanation of discussion's effect. Experiment 2 showed that promises to cooperate substantially increased cooperation rates, but only when everyone in the discussing group promised. We discuss one model in which discussion promotes group identity (as indicated by consensual promising) and therefore cooperation, and another in which discussion provides an opportunity for promise making, which—at least when it is universal—explains discussion's effect without any involvement of group identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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