Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 113 (2) , 467-496
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555658
Abstract
We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. “Private ownership” leadsKeywords
All Related Versions
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