Analysis
- 19 March 1998
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is presented as an underlying assumption of the book, and related to the desire for consistency and generality in moral theory. Hare's notion of two levels of morality is defended.Keywords
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