Micro-Determinism and Concepts of Emergence
- 1 March 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 51 (1) , 44-63
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289163
Abstract
Contemporary scientific theories assume a primarily micro-deterministic view of nature. This paper explores the question of whether micro-determinism is incompatible with the alleged emergence of properties and laws that some biologists and philosophers assert occurs in various biological systems. I argue that a preferable unified treatment of these emergence claims takes properties, rather than laws, to be the units of emergence. Four distinct conceptions of emergence are explored and three shown to be compatible with micro-determinism. The remaining concept of emergence, direct macro-determination, does not, I argue, meet the general requirement that an adequate scientific explanation provide a coherent mechanism or effective means of determination.This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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