The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800–1914

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
Sometimes we are least aware of that which most affects us. So it seems with respect to legal categories. Lawyers do not take legal categories very seriously today. But they should. Legal categories are central to legal reasoning; indeed it is almost impossible to imagine legal reasoning without the use of categories. Categorical thinking affects every area of law. In constitutional law, for example, equal protection analysis turns crucially on categories of affected interests. Specialists in landlord-tenant law debate whether the implied covenant of habitability is a property doctrine or a contract doctrine. And if the public/private distinction is dead, as some reports have suggested, it rules us yet from its grave. Legal categories are not simply housekeeping devices. They inhibit our imagination of what is acceptable, indeed, of what is possible. They take on a quality of givenness and thereby disempower us. We can retain control over categories, and ultimately over our own legal imagination, only by reminding ourselves that we have created them and are capable of remaking them.

This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit: