Value of communication in agencies
Open Access
- 1 April 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 47 (2) , 334-368
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90023-9
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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