Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods. We ask whether the impulse to punish isKeywords
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