PAPERWORK AND BUREAUCRACY
- 1 July 1979
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 17 (3) , 435-451
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1979.tb00541.x
Abstract
This study explores paperwork as an inherent characteristic of bureaucratic behavior. The magnitude and scope of the federal government paperwork burden on the private sector is given particular emphasis. A theoretical model of bureaucratic behavior is developed which shows that bureaucrats employ paperwork to shift the cost of agency functions to the private sector in order to increase their perquisites of office. The model indicates that, if the private sector were compensated for the federal paperwork burden, agency employment would be smaller, as would agency output and the volume of private-sector labor expended in preparing federal forms.Keywords
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