Preventing Systemic War

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Abstract
In this article, an equilibrium theory of conflict behavior is developed in which there exists a balance or equilibrium in the number of disputes begun and ended in a given time period. Significant interdependence as the result of diffusion, reinforcement, or a common source of conflict behavior leads to departures from the equilibrium model that, in turn, are associated with the onset of systemic, or global, war. Using a set of serious international disputes occurring in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nineteenth century is found to fit the equilibrium model, but the period approaching World War I does not, when all disputes involving both major and minor powers are considered. Disputes involving only major powers constitute a stable system in both the nineteenth century and pre-World War I period. Implications for crisis management and conflict resolution are developed through the use of disjoint sets that effectively separate the different kinds of disputes, which together could lead to global war.

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