Representing defaults with epistemic concepts
- 1 January 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Computational Intelligence
- Vol. 5 (1) , 32-44
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8640.1989.tb00313.x
Abstract
Reasoning about defaults—implications that typically hold, but which may have exceptions—is an important part of commonsense reasoning. We present some parts of a theory of defaults, concentrating on distinctions between various subtle ways in which defaults can be defeated, and on inferences which seem plausible but which are not correct in all cases. To represent this theory in a formal system, it is natural to use the epistemic concept of self‐belief. We show how to express the theory by a local translation into autoepistemic logic, which contains the requisite epistemic operators.Keywords
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