A Gruesome Problem for the Curve-Fitting Solution
- 1 September 1997
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 48 (3) , 391-396
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/48.3.391
Abstract
This paper is a response to Forster and Sober's [1994] solution to the curve-fitting problem. If their solution is correct, it will provide us with a solution to the New Riddle of Induction as well as provide a basis for choosing realism over conventionalism. Examining this solution is also important as Forster and Sober incorporate it in much of their other philosophical work (see Forster [1995a, b, 1994] and Sober [1996, 1995, 1993]). I argue that Forster and Sober's solution is subject precisely to the problem they seek to solve. They provide a method of choosing among hypotheses but only at the cost of requiring that we have a method of choosing between different ways of conceptualizing the world. Thus the solution raises a new problem—the world-fitting problem.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Parsimony and predictive equivalenceErkenntnis, 1996
- Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to ConfirmationThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1995
- Why Not Solipsism?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995
- The Golfer's Dilemma: A Reply to Kukla on Curve-FittingThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1995
- Forster and Sober on the Curve-Fitting ProblemThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1995
- Non-bayesian foundations for statistical estimation, prediction, and the ravens exampleErkenntnis, 1994
- How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or LessAd HocTheories will Provide More Accurate PredictionsThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994
- Gruesome SimplicityPhilosophy of Science, 1976