The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift
Top Cited Papers
- 1 September 2002
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 69 (3) , 452-473
- https://doi.org/10.1086/342454
Abstract
We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biology—the ‘explananda of selection’ debate and the ‘units of selection’ debate.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Adaptation and EnvironmentPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1995
- The Empire of ChancePublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1989