A Cognitive Analysis of Japan's 1941 Decision for War

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Abstract
Previous studies have found that the cognitive performance of government decision-makers declines in crises that result in war. This decline has been attributed to crisis-produced stress which leads to simplification of information processing. The present study tested the disruptive stress hypothesis in the context of Japan's decision for war in 1941. Two content analysis techniques, integrative complexity coding (Schroder et al.,) and cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976) were used to analyze the translated records of statements by key Japanese policy-makers. Comparisons between statements made in the early and late periods of the 1941 crisis yielded only weak evidence of cognitive simplification. Interestingly, however, the social context in which statements were made significantly affected the complexity of cognitive performance: Statements made in Liaison conterences (in which policies were formulated) were significantly less complex than statements made in Imperial conferences (in which policies were presented to the Emperor for approval). Theoretical and methodological implications of the results were discussed.

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