The Indonesian Military and Economic Policy
- 1 April 1976
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Modern Asian Studies
- Vol. 10 (2) , 249-284
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00005953
Abstract
Nothing foments institutional change so much as a sense of past institutional failure. The New Order that came into being as a result of the October 1965 assumption of power by the ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) inherited a crisis situation in economic policy. Decades of economic decay and capital dis-investment had brought the Indonesian economy to the brink of catastrophe. However, just as all revolutions are born in an ancien régime, so the heritage of the bygone Sukarno era left control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy at the disposal of the state and thereby eased the institutional transformation.Keywords
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