Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections
- 1 March 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 103 (1) , 88-105
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2825
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournamentsSocial Choice and Welfare, 2001
- Cycling of simple rules in the spatial modelSocial Choice and Welfare, 1999
- Comparison functions and choice correspondencesSocial Choice and Welfare, 1999
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial modelJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1995
- Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting GamesMathematics of Operations Research, 1992
- Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondenceJournal of Economic Theory, 1988
- The Uncovered Set and the CoreAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1987
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a coreSocial Choice and Welfare, 1984
- Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorEconometrica, 1984
- Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting modelsJournal of Economic Theory, 1979