Portfolio Delegation Under Short-selling Constraints
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study delegated portfolio management when the manager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show that under moral hazard, lKeywords
All Related Versions
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