Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems

This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:

• Optimal Auction Design
  Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
  Econometrica, 1981
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
  Journal of Economic Theory, 1979
• Incentives and incomplete information
  Journal of Public Economics, 1979
• Moral Hazard and Observability
  The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
  Econometrica, 1979
• The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
  The Bell Journal of Economics, 1976
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
  Econometrica, 1973
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1952