Conjoint Analysis of Negotiator Preferences

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Abstract
Negotiator preferences are a universal element of conflict resolution theories, but have posed problems of operationalization which have hampered empirical verification and development of the theories. Conjoint analysis is proposed as a method for assessing the preferences of negotiators and their constituencies generally, and union, management, and employee preferences in a collective bargaining context, specifically. The technique is useful to researchers and practitioners in that it is easier to apply than Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) utility theory, and provides more information than simple issueprioritizing techniques. Conjoint analysis is used to analyze a simulated contract negotiation and shown to be both practical and valid. The technique is described and assessed; research and practical application are suggested in the areas of contract negotiation and third party intervention. An application of the technique for testing the Nash (1953) model of bargaining is included as an illustration of the technique's usefulness.

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