The Voracity Effect
- 1 March 1999
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 89 (1) , 22-46
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.22
Abstract
We analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a “voracity effect,” by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more-than-proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks. (JEL F43, O10, O23, O40)Keywords
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