Abstract
This article proposes a differential sensitivity hypothesis, according to which central (i.e., relatively high in personal descriptiveness and importance) and peripheral (i.e., relatively low in personal descriptiveness and importance) self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: Peripheral self-conceptions are subject to a mood-congruency bias, whereas central self-conceptions are unaffected by mood. In 4 experiments, participants were first placed into a sad, neutral, or happy mood state through a guided imagery task and later completed behavior self-descriptiveness ratings, trait self-descriptiveness ratings, and trait self-descriptiveness judgmental latencies. Strong support for the differential sensitivity hypothesis was obtained. Peripheral self-conceptions were influenced by mood because they were less elaborated and consolidated and were held with lower certainty, thus increasing the likelihood for the occurrence of constructive, affect-infusing processes (J.P. Forgas, 1995a).

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