Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
- 1 October 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 31 (1) , 68-87
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90021-2
Abstract
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This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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