Representation and Explanation
- 1 December 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 51 (4) , 550-572
- https://doi.org/10.1086/289205
Abstract
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social u...Keywords
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